
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Postconflict Development: Meeting New Challenges

edited by Gerd Junne and Willemijn Verkoren

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The Challenges of Postconflict Development

Gerd Junne Willemijn Verkoren

his book deals with the many countries that have gone through a period of violent civil strife. Its focus is on the period immediately following such unrest. The term "postconflict development" can be misleading in this context. There are few truly postconflict situations. Conflicts become more or less violent, more or less manifest or latent, but they seldom stop altogether. "Postconflict" in this book is shorthand for conflict situations, in which open warfare has come to an end. Such situations remain tense for years or decades and can easily relapse into large-scale violence. In 44 percent of all postconflict situations, war resumes in the first five years after the violence has stopped (World Bank 2004, 8), and about 50 percent of postconflict countries revert back to war in the first decade of peace (Collier et al. 2003, 7). Recent violent conflict, therefore, is the best predictor of future largescale violence.

One of the crucial determinants of whether the shooting and looting will start again may be the degree of economic and social development that has been achieved in the meantime and the fair distribution of its fruits to different groups of the population. The World Bank notes that "countries affected by conflict face a two-way relationship between conflict and poverty—pervasive poverty makes societies more vulnerable to violent conflict, while conflict itself creates more poverty" (World Bank 2004, 14).

Economic development gives different groups something to work on together. Orientation may change from looking at the past to focusing on the future. An interesting job is not only an alternative to fighting but could also give rise to a new professional identity. If people see another perspective than continuous fighting, they may be more resistant to renewing conflict. One could argue that there will be fewer fighters to pick up their arms as well as stronger efforts to stop those who will.

There may be cases, however, when some economic development could be the precondition for the resumption of fighting. If the decline of military activity is due mainly to the exhaustion of the conflicting parties and a lack of means to continue, then development may take these constraints away, and with a culture of conflict unabated, violent conflict may resume. Therefore, it is not just economic growth that is important but a specific economic development that addresses the grievances of different groups, allows compromise between contending factions, and offers sufficiently attractive alternatives to the main opponents.

Economic development itself is certainly no guarantee against violent conflict. But a lack of development can be a guarantee for the resumption of violence. If a large number of young males remain unemployed, if conflicts about scarce resources remain intense, if there is no perspective for some way out of the present misery and a normal life, then chances are high that conflicts will become violent again.

The label "postconflict development" may have originally been inspired by the wish to return to normal development strategies after the interruption of development by civil wars. The World Bank, particularly, has been accused of wanting to apply the usual development strategies (market orientation, liberalization, privatization, etc.) too quickly after violent conflicts (cf. Moore 2000), though its creation of a "Post-Conflict Unit" in 1997 demonstrated the acknowledgment that countries emerging out of such a situation may need a special approach.¹ In line with international initiatives to use development assistance for conflict prevention, the World Bank in 2001 broadened its approach from one focusing on rebuilding infrastructure to one that "seeks to understand the root causes of conflict, to integrate a sensitivity to conflict in Bank activities and to promote assistance that minimizes the potential causes of conflict" (World Bank 2004, 8). In accordance with this, the Post-Conflict Unit changed its name to "Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit."

Despite recognition by the World Bank (and others)² that development strategies may have to differ in postconflict situations, "there is no consensus, let alone best practices, on how to integrate the conflict nexus or the key elements of conflict-affected PRSP [Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper] processes" (World Bank 2004, 14).

However, the number of developing countries that have recently been the scene of civil strife is such that postconflict development has become the norm rather than the exception. The pursuance of traditional development strategies may have even contributed to the increase rather than prevention of violent conflicts. With a large share in state income in the poorest countries, development aid given to governments can incite opposition groups to fight for their share. "Structural adjustment" reduces the capacity of states to respond to the needs of their population, increases general dissatisfaction with the government, and intensifies the struggle for the remaining sources of income.

Having explained what is meant by "postconflict," we will complete this section by adding a few words about what we mean by "development." More than referring simply to economic growth, development is about improving the standard of living for all people in poor countries. As such, development includes improvements in areas as diverse as health, environment, education, and political participation. The United Nations Development Program's (UNDP's) Human Development Index represents a good tool to measure progress in this respect.

Peace Versus Development in Postconflict Situations

Violent conflicts at the end of the twentieth century devastated many developing countries and thwarted development efforts in which vast amounts of human energy and money were invested. Many countries are actually worse off than they had been when they became independent. With every violent conflict, a society loses part of its capacity to handle future conflicts in a peaceful way (Miall 2001, 15).

Organizations involved in conflict resolution and peacebuilding, therefore, argue for a shift in emphasis (and financial means) from development projects to peacebuilding and conflict prevention. These organizations contend that a relatively small effort to avoid violent conflict could save large investments in development and prevent enormous expenditures for peacemaking, peacekeeping, and the alleviation of humanitarian problems that result from large-scale violent conflict. To some extent, this competition for means pits development organizations and peace builders against each other.

A close look reveals that the cleavage is not just between these two groups but rather between three groups: organizations involved in conflict prevention and resolution, organizations that offer humanitarian help in emergency situations, and organizations concentrating on longterm capacity development and institution building. They may have different priorities, different experience, and their involvement implies specific risks (see Table 1.1).

	Organizations' Focus		
_	Peacebuilding	Emergency Help	Long-term Development
Example	Search for Common Ground	Médecins Sans Frontières	Oxfam
Priorities	End and prevent violence; stimulate better understanding between different groups of the population	Satisfy basic human needs (water, food, shelter, health)	Create structures that promote long-term sustainable growth and social stability
Experience	Mediation, dialogue, mass communication, and education	Technical, medical, logistical, and organizational	Agricultural, economic, and technical; institution building
Blind spots	Economic underpinnings of reconciliation processes; immediate needs of victims	Long-term effect of humanitarian aid on future government activity and legitimacy	Security risks to development projects; possible contribution of aid to conflict dynamics
Risks	Locks parties into conflicting identities and can perpetuate cleavages	Undermines build-up of government activities and institution building	-

Table 1.1 Differences Between Conflict Resolution, Humanitarian, and Development Agencies

Recognition of the need to reconcile the fields of development and peacebuilding is growing. In a report written for the UNDP, for example, Bernard Wood concludes that "development cooperation itself needs to apply the lessons of experience, and improve its own flexibility and practices to maximise its contributions . . . in helping build peace and prevent violent conflict" (Wood 2001, 10). From a more theoretical perspective, Mark Duffield notes that "development concerns have become increasingly important in relation to how security is understood." The growing use of the concept of "human security" by UN and other international planners also testifies to this. Duffield even goes so far as to say that it is "now generally accepted that international organisations should be aware of conflict and, where possible, gear their work towards conflict resolution and helping to rebuild war-torn societies in a way that will avert future violence" (Duffield 2001, 1).³ Little has been written, however, about how that should be done. Duffield writes, "[T]he new development-security terrain remains underresearched and its study has yet to establish its own conceptual language" (Duffield 2001, 9). This book aims to contribute to that understanding by identifying *how* international organizations, and other actors designing and implementing development strategies in postconflict settings, should go about doing this.

Different organizations have had different reasons to give relatively little attention to the problem of postconflict development. Organizations that specialize in conflict prevention and conflict resolution have seen their hopes shattered by war and may find it too early to work with a highly traumatized population. Humanitarian organizations rush in but are neither interested in the causes of the conflict nor in long-term development. Development organizations see these situations as an exception and may find the situation too unstable to resume their work.

Scholars (and politicians) interested in conflict transformation and conflict resolution often pay attention to a conflict as long as it is "hot." Once the violent phase is over and the situation starts to stabilize, there are always enough other hotspots on earth to shift attention to those areas deemed more in need. Those who stay behind, then, suddenly find that their funds dry up and that their work cannot be continued.

Organizations concentrating on emergency relief are structurally pressed for time. Dealing with emergencies, they cannot devote too much attention either to the root causes of conflict nor to the long-term development perspectives of the region. The root causes often are of little concern to them. In most cases, they are contested anyway, and the organizations want to stay as impartial as possible in order to maintain access to the victims of violent conflicts. They are neither equipped nor willing to handle long-term development issues.

Scholars specializing in development questions also tend to neglect the topic. Development theory itself has been questioned from all sides. It is already difficult enough to devise development strategies for a "normal" country, let alone for a country torn apart by civil conflicts. In such a situation, some of the established knowledge about development processes (e.g., spend less money on military and police and liberalize capital flows) seems less applicable. Development economists often do not have much feeling for politics, although the recent "aid effectiveness debate" has prompted development scholars and practitioners to look more closely at the role of political and legal structures in stimulating or inhibiting development. The growing attention for the role of the state in development is also related to the increasingly pressing issues of postconflict development, which obviously is burdened with heavy political problems.⁴ Aid agencies "began to seek broader strategies that would strengthen citizens' capacities and reduce their vulnerability so that they would be more resilient against adverse shocks: The trick of aid delivery in these cases is to secure more stable livelihoods and—ultimately—more stable polities" (Munro 2001, 8–9). Still, development economists' unease with political issues remains, and many continue to avoid a thorough analysis of conflict altogether.

The different types of organizations form part of different "epistemic communities," which all center on their own discourses, with relatively little overlap and discussions between these different groups. With this book, we should like to make a contribution to the integration of these three fields. We are convinced that the activities of the three groups do not just complement each other, but that—in order to do their own work properly—they will have to integrate each others' perspectives into their own work and act accordingly.

Conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts can only be fruitful in the long run if they consist of activities involving all other kinds of policy development as well as permeate all development projects and policy issues. Emergency help should contribute to peacebuilding instead of prolonging conflicts, and it should not stand in the way of long-term development efforts. And future-oriented development planning has to take the realities of a conflict-torn society into account and conceive development strategies that help to overcome existing cleavages rather than perpetuate or aggravate them.

Existing development strategies and plans, therefore, have to be reevaluated. The reasons that have led to large-scale violence have to be analyzed and taken into account in order to avoid having the development efforts again thwarted by large-scale conflicts.

Thus, the primordial task of postconflict development is not just rebuilding or reconstruction, because this may lead to the rebuilding of the very structures that have given rise to the devastating conflicts (see Chapter 17 in this volume). What the situation demands is another type of development that addresses these structures and helps to avoid violent conflict. The immediate aftermath of such conflicts can create a political window of opportunity in which all parties agree that basic structures of society have to be changed to avoid a repetition of disastrous destruction. A new social contract may have to be forged.

Conflict-Conscious Development

Development efforts thus have to take the conflicts explicitly into account. Planners not only have to acknowledge the existence of con-

flicts, they must address the very causes of conflicts in order to avoid aggravating them. Much of development thinking has been influenced by the World Bank, which often pursued a development strategy that knew little variation from country to country. But development strategies for conflict-torn societies do have to differ, depending on the causes of conflict.

One of the basic assumptions of this book is that the challenges of postconflict development vary with the causes of conflict. Four clusters of causes can be distinguished, depending on the level of social organization at which the root causes are situated: external/international, characteristics of the state, characteristics of society, or individual orientations.

1. *External/international:* The root causes may be found outside the country in question. The remnants of colonial rule may have left social cleavages that are not yet overcome. Different groups of the population may be set up against each other by external intervention. Or social frictions may be caused by the process of globalization, which exposes the whole fabric of society to harsher external competition, thereby aggravating the internal competition for resources.

2. *Characteristics of the state:* The state may be too strong or too weak. A weak state cannot protect its citizens, who may then turn to subnational organizations (militia, gangs, etc.) for protection. Or the state can be oppressive, giving rise to resistance and separatist movements. If the state is a main (or even the only) source of income (e.g., from mineral resources or from development aid), then conflict about access to these resources can be expected.

3. *Characteristics of society:* Specific characteristics of society can make conflicts more probable. Great economic inequalities lead to class struggle. Ethnic cleavages are a fertile feeding ground for rival nationalisms. Or the prominent forms of economic activity may lead to an overuse of natural resources (land, water) that could cause conflicts about the ever scarcer means to earn a living. However, an abundance of natural resources may also lead to conflict (Renner 2002; Smillie 2002).

4. *Individual orientations:* The root causes could also, finally, be situated in the heads of people. They may be divided by different political ideologies, as was the case during the Cold War. They may adhere to different religions. Or they may speak different languages, which may also imply different cultures, images, customs, and worldviews.

The different root causes cannot always be clearly distinguished. They normally interact. Colonial rule may have given rise to a weak state, and the weak state in turn cannot resist the forces of globalization. International competition can increase tensions between different ethnicities, which often overlap with class affiliation and language spoken. Nevertheless, different conflicts have different dominant causes that may pose different challenges for postconflict development.

Let us illustrate this idea on the basis of the relatively technical task of rebuilding infrastructure after the destruction of roads, railways, bridges, air fields, electricity production and distribution, water installations, and the like. Rebuilding may not be a good idea altogether. All too often, the infrastructure was inherited from the colonial period, when it mainly gave access to raw materials and facilitated their transport to the nearest harbor. This has led in many countries to a kind of feudal structure of roads and railroads: They connect the periphery to the capital but do not connect the different parts of the country to one another. If the different parts of the country were to acquire an interest in each others' well-being, they should get better connected to deepen the internal division of labor.

If the state obtains large funds to build a new infrastructure but is itself firmly in the hands of a specific group, then this group can enrich itself by putting an infrastructure in place that primarily serves its own needs—by passing on important orders to affiliated construction companies or by receiving large bribes from foreign companies that get the orders. Conflicts may result also from investment patterns of former governments that may have given advantages to regions in which their own constituency is situated while disadvantaging others. This can spur resistance or separatist movements. The process of rebuilding can fuel these rivalries anew. Even a fair distribution of infrastructure projects, which explicitly takes the existing cleavages into account, can perpetuate these cleavages, because it strengthens the thinking in terms of conflicting political constituencies, rather than in terms of optimal public services.

Construction projects for infrastructure provide an important source of employment not only for the duration of construction. The sites themselves determine very much the distribution of future life chances for different groups of the population. Decisions about construction sites are, therefore, even less than in other cases the result of neutral, technical evaluation.

There is an additional aspect that has to be taken into account. In a society torn apart by serious conflicts, infrastructure projects have to be located and structured in such a way that they do not give one party a strategic advantage over another, such as the opportunity to cut off water or electricity or to deny access to a harbor. The location of infrastructure projects can have an immediate impact on the power structure in a country. Sometimes, a technically suboptimal solution may have to be chosen so that one group does not get an unfair advantage over another.

Large parts of infrastructure development also have an intrinsically political character: Better roads are not merely a precondition for access to markets. They can also have a predominantly military character and lay open the vast hinterland. They provide opportunities for a quick relocation of troops and thus give central government an advantage, while reducing the opportunity for guerrilla movements to hide in regions that are difficult to access.

To avoid the politicization of decisions about the future infrastructure, it may be tempting for state authorities and international organizations to opt for the privatization of parts of the infrastructure (electricity, water), which—at least for a while—used to correspond to the preference of many international donors anyway. This, however, is more problematic, too, in a conflict-ridden society than elsewhere (see Chapter 11 by Bertine Kamphuis). The business community may be organized along ethnic lines, and increased prices for privatized services may intensify existing social cleavages.

Another dilemma that has less to do with the different root causes of conflict is the tension between the objectives of peace and development. To achieve peace and a quick normalization of daily life, fast (re)construction of infrastructure can be desirable, if necessary by foreign firms. From a development point of view, it would be more desirable to put local constructors to work that make more use of local manpower and create more local employment. But construction may take longer, and sometimes quality criteria may not be met. From the political view, much public discussion may be desirable. Especially in a community that is deeply divided, this would take much time before results are reached and stands in the way of short-term reconstruction and economic growth.

Culture in Postconflict Development

Most of the chapters in this book deal with economic and political structures and developments. They concentrate on an increase in material welfare; on personal security from military threats, criminal acts, and human rights violations; and on equal participation in political decisionmaking. Some critics have mentioned that such an approach misses the crucial point—that it looks at development too much through a Western lens in which welfare ranks quite high on the list of priorities. If culture does not receive enough attention, it will not be possible to understand how formal political structures and institutions work.⁵

Other cultures have different priorities. David Pinto (2000b, 32) distinguishes two different pyramids of needs (see Figure 1.1) in which "self-fulfillment" stands at the top of a Western pyramid and "honor" at the top of an alternative pyramid that is more representative for societies in which the group plays a central role.

Conflicting parties may not necessarily be interested in more income and welfare. Any improvements in living standards will remain overshadowed by the immense differences if compared to Western countries, which still keeps them in a kind of underdog position. They want, foremost, to uphold their honor.⁶ They want to be recognized as equals. They want to overcome the humiliation that they have experienced at the hands of their adversary, at the hands of former colonial powers, or as a result of their inferior position in the international division of labor and world politics. Recognition is at the top of their agenda. This obviously poses quite different problems and challenges for postconflict development. Development itself may have to be defined in different terms.

In spite of the importance of these aspects, we have not included any contribution on cultural facets of postconflict development in this volume. There are at least three reasons for that, among them:




Figure 1.1 Different Priorities

Source: David Pinto, Een nieuw perspectief. Herziening van beleid, onderwijs, communicatie, maslowpiramide dringend nodig (Amsterdam: Vossiuspers AUP, 2000b), 32.

1. Culture is defined as those characteristics that only change slowly. While cultural change is needed, this obviously is a kind of longterm development, difficult to achieve in a few years after large-scale violence stopped. It also usually changes as a result of other developments, not through conscious design. Cultural changes follow other changes (e.g., when a democratic system brings satisfactory results, democratic culture may grow).

2. Culture is specific to a region or population. Because it is specific, it is difficult to generalize how culture affects the prospects of post-conflict development.

3. "Culture" itself is an umbrella term for quite different phenomena, ranging from religion to language to customs and value systems. It is linked to—and may change as a result of—changes in everything from the mode of production (nomadic versus sedentary) to the degree of urbanization and the geographical relationship to the rest of the world (urban versus rural, capital versus province, cosmopolitan versus parochial) to work ethics (Calvinist versus Catholic) and value systems (masculine versus feminine).

These issues are complex enough to warrant another volume or series of volumes.

A Holistic View of Postconflict Development

It sounds perhaps strange to explain first why an important factor has been left out and then formulate claims with regard to a holistic view on postconflict development. What we aim at is to bring the different issues analyzed together. Individual people/professionals/civil servants or staffs of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) will often have to deal with one specific sector or institution. That is why this volume follows a sectoral approach. But at the same time, we are, of course, aware that the development in the different sectors is highly dependent on what happens in the other sectors touched upon. Therefore, all chapter authors have been encouraged to point out as explicitly as possible the links between their issue or sector and the societal context. In addition, we have added three chapters that try to bring the different aspects together in a country study on postconflict development. El Salvador seems to be an example of a success story, relatively speaking, whereas Cambodia is not. Mozambique, often praised for its success, might be somewhere in between. However, a closer analysis may reveal that it is quite problematic (see Chapter 15 by Joseph Hanlon).

Structure of the Book

At the very basis of postconflict development is the security dilemma. Only if security can be guaranteed to some degree can any kind of development take off. Nobody will invest in the future without a minimum of stability. Security is a central issue in any postconflict situation, affecting the prospects for development and peacebuilding. In Chapter 2, Dirk Salomons notes that the successful disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants represent "the touchstone, the moment of truth" for any peacebuilding process. Salomons's chapter addresses the conditions that support or threaten the successful reintegration of former combatants into society. It describes the component elements of such a process and provides illustrations of activities that have been effective, as well as of initiatives that have failed. The "seductive tenacity of war economies" constitutes an important barrier to the success of DDR and of postconflict development as a whole, and no strategy of DDR can succeed without taking this aspect into account. What, then, can the international community do to help to shape a secure environment after conflict by supporting DDR? The basic formula, writes Salomons, is simple: Where strong political will, effective military enforcement capacity, and sufficient economic resources converge, the transition from a war economy to a peaceful society has a fair chance of succeeding.

In Chapter 3, Jose Luis Herrero addresses the (re)building of state institutions in the immediate aftermath of violent conflict, which is a unique undertaking that has little resemblance to standard institutionbuilding efforts or development work. The main differences lie in the order of priorities; in the aftermath of violent conflict, there is one obvious priority: avoiding renewed violence. Introducing a fully democratic system does not guarantee the preservation of peace in a situation such as the one in Kosovo, which was characterized by a collapse of previously existing official administrative structures; a withdrawal of previously existing security and law enforcement structures; and the prevalence of the ethnic, political, and social tensions that originated the conflict. In such a situation, democratization may have to proceed gradually. Thus, as in Kosovo, allocating fixed numbers of parliamentary seats to minority groups may be a useful tool to prevent violence and discrimination during the early stages of institution building and postconflict development. In addition, contrary to what is being done in Afghanistan and Iraq, the UN administration in Kosovo did not grant formal independent authority to local representatives for as long as they were not democratically elected. Because local authorities appointed by a third party lack legitimacy, this intermediary step is a crucial one.

Chapter 4 deals with the development of local institutions in the postconflict phase. There is a general trend toward decentralization and devolution in developing countries as a way to increase good governance. Tanja Hohe illuminates some of the pitfalls of these processes in postconflict countries, drawing lessons from the Community Empowerment and Local Governance Project (CEP) launched in East Timor by the World Bank and the UN. To engage in social engineering exercises seems very tempting in a postconflict scenario. Yet without full knowledge of local dynamics, the empowerment of new leaders will fail as local realities are stronger; traditional leaders and power structures will continue to exist parallel to the new institutions. The same constraint counts for democratization and the promotion of gender equality and raises the question of when and how far to buy into local power structures.

In Chapter 5 Mark Plunkett addresses the issues that arise when attempts are made to restore or create the rule of law in the aftermath of violent conflict. In peace operations the (re)establishment of the rule of law must take priority over, and take place irrespective of, constitutional settlement. The task of a peace operation is to restore the rule of law first and foremost before re-creating the state. This restoration of the rule of law is achieved through the delivery of specific peace operation justice packages using a combination of the enforcement model and the negotiated model. The enforcement model entails legitimate, minimal, and lawfully sanctioned coercion such as arrest, prosecution, detention, and trial by war crimes tribunals and transitional peace operations courts. It also includes public shaming and office disqualification by peace operation criminal justice commissions and resourcing and training local judges, police, prosecutors, defenders, and custodial officers. The negotiated model is an important complementary package of measures that contribute to the public internalization and acceptance of the rule of law, including securing voluntary compliance by negotiating fundamental shifts in population consciousness at the three levels of the elite leadership, functionary, and village level to replace the culture of violence with negotiated management systems. The negotiated model ensures that the establishment of the rule of law is shaped by the desires and needs of the population.

Chapter 6 looks at the seemingly neutral (re)building of infrastructure. In fact, as Richard H. Brown shows, the reconstruction and development of infrastructure after war is not a mere technical task but requires a deep understanding of socioeconomic and physical elements as they relate to the long-term needs of a country and its communities. Planners should be sensitive to the fact that infrastructure can serve to connect as well as divide communities. Wherever conflict has divided communities, the connecting potential of infrastructure should be an integral part of any strategic plan for reconstruction. Interaction with the communities concerned is a prerequisite for a successful rebuilding strategy. The importance of getting it right the first time cannot be overstated. The (re)establishment of infrastructure, particularly electricity, water, and telecommunications networks, is for the long term; prescribing dividing networks is likely to reinforce political/ethnic divisions for a lengthy time, while establishing connecting networks, delivered with sensitivity, can contribute very positively to long-term political/ethnic harmony.

The role of the news media in contributing to peacebuilding after conflict is discussed in Chapter 7 by Ross Howard. In the past the media have functioned as a weapon for war as well as an instrument of conflict resolution. Particularly in democratizing environments, there is a window of opportunity to help the media to steer the right course. But what does this right course entail? There is a healthy debate over journalistic objectivity versus intent and responsibility in shaping people's perceptions toward understanding and reconciliation. In fact, journalists mediate conflicts whether they intend to or not. Even free media in a democratic environment can exacerbate conflicts: Bad news has a higher news value, and a concentration on such news can have a negative impact on the perception of "the other." But even with no intent beyond doing the job according to accepted standards, the news media can deliver an essential requisite of conflict resolution, which is communication. The media educates, corrects misperceptions, identifies underlying interests, and humanizes the parties to the dispute. It also provides an emotional outlet, enables consensus building, and can offer solutions and build confidence. In the 1990s, the media's peacebuilding potential became integrated into the foreign aid and intervention policies of a number of major donors. The purpose of most of the interventions remains the support of conventional, reliable journalism. However, there is also a new trend to foster media activities that go well beyond conventional journalism, aiming to produce information specifically designed to influence attitudes toward conflict resolution.

In postconflict situations that involve issues directly related to education—such as the recognition of identity, cultural development, community survival, the distribution of resources, and access to political power—usually little attention is paid to educational reform. Wondem Asres Degu makes a plea in Chapter 8 for more attention to education in the postconflict phase. The content of curricula significantly affects attitudes and ideas of communities, contributing either to conflict or to peacebuilding. In addition, seemingly technical decisions, such as in which language to teach, can also affect the fragile peace that has been established. Another issue is that in many cases the education system does not match the demands of the labor market. Degu addresses these and other issues prevalent in the education sector in postconflict situations, drawing mainly on experiences in Ethiopia.

The health system is discussed in Chapter 9 of the book. In postconflict situations, health facilities are often damaged or destroyed, and there is a shortage of health personnel, both because many fled the country during the conflict and because of limited training opportunities. At the same time, the health situation is often alarming. Many have been injured in the war. In refugee camps there are often risks of epidemics. Many people experience mental health problems such as traumas. Building on the East Timorese experience, which in many respects offered the ideal circumstances for a rapid reconstruction of the health system, Vanessa van Schoor discusses the right and wrong ways of dealing with such a situation. How can available funds best be used? Has the establishment of health services helped to move the East Timorese away from future violence?

Environmental concerns, writes Martijn Bijlsma in Chapter 10, should not be left out of postconflict development planning. Not only can a conflict have environmental causes and consequences, which need to be addressed, but the postconflict phase also presents opportunities for incorporating environmental concerns into policy. When addressing environmental issues in a postconflict situation, decisionmakers will have to be highly aware of the remaining conflict potential, as well as the general limitations posed by the situation. Among the specific dilemmas that decisionmakers might be confronted with are the politicization of environmental policy, bias in the selection of beneficiaries, hostility between institutions involved in environmental operations, and a lack of resources. Citing examples from El Salvador and elsewhere, Bijlsma expands on these issues and makes a case for the incorporation of environmental concerns to achieve more sustainable postconflict development.

Central to this book's attempt to combine the development and peacebuilding schools is a conflict-sensitive economic strategy. In Chapter 11, Bertine Kamphuis sketches some of the main concerns that economic policymakers should consider in postconflict contexts. Protracted violent conflicts change the economic structures of national economies profoundly and create a "conflict economy," one not quickly altered by a peace agreement. Such an economy perpetuates the very structures that have given rise to the conflict and can easily lead to new violence. A conflict economy consists of four different subeconomies: the "international aid economy," the "criminal economy," the "informal economy," and the remaining "formal economy," which covers only a small fraction of the total economic activity. Rebel groups, violent and criminal entrepreneurs, and aid agencies create new structures of access to resources and power. These alternative structures produce new winners and losers. Economic winners and losers of the conflict economy can be found at both sides of the conflict, independent of who won or lost the civil war. Kamphuis assesses the impact of economic policy on the conflict economy for the policy fields of employment, taxation, privatization, and export. Her chapter discusses which economic policy is a stumbling block or a stepping stone to peacebuilding.

In Chapter 12, Tony Addison, Abdur R. Chowdhury, and S. Mansoob Murshed address the role of finance in postconflict development. How to pay for reconstruction? How to build a conflict-sensitive financial system? The chapter looks at the financial effects of conflict as well as the effects of financial policy on peacebuilding, paying special attention to the tax system, currency reform, banking, and poverty reduction. The authors argue that notwithstanding the political challenges, countries should aim for a *broad-based* recovery that benefits the majority of people and not just a narrow elite. An overarching priority for the poor should be central in postconflict reconstruction strategies. To achieve this, currency reform should be directed toward ensuring a rapid resumption of normal economic activity, and every effort must be made to ensure that banks engage in sound lending, as financial problems invariably become fiscal problems.

Chapter 13 deals with the role of international donor assistance in postconflict development. Rex Brynen looks at donor assistance to two of the largest programs of peacebuilding in the post–Cold War period, drawing on a number of lessons from the program in Palestine and analyzing the role of the donors in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Both Palestine and Afghanistan represent cases of peacebuilding and reconstruction amid uncertainty, tension, violence, and the danger of a return to war. Four issues of donor assistance are explored in particular detail: pledging gaps and disbursement delays, aid coordination, host-country ownership, and the political usages of aid.

Three case studies have been included in the book to illuminate the interactions between the various policy areas discussed in the preceding chapters and to provide concrete examples of more and less successful postconflict development practices. The first case study, in Chapter 14,

deals with El Salvador. Chris van der Borgh pays particular attention to the dynamics of local capacity building by international donors and organizations, looking at rural development programs in Chalatenango, a province in El Salvador that was heavily affected by the civil war. Numerous international donors started working in this province to support the process of reconstruction. As political tensions are still considerable, the choice to work with particular actors and to bypass others is crucial. Do external agents choose to work with government agents, groups from civil society, or political parties (or a combination of them)? How do external agents and local counterparts establish their agenda? What are the consequences of development programs for political processes at both the village level and the provincial level?

In Chapter 15, Joseph Hanlon takes a closer look at developments in Mozambique, a country often cited as a success story of postconflict development. Hanlon stresses the necessity to qualify this success, however. Over a decade after the peace accord, there are growing concerns about the stability of the country on two grounds: Growth has been sharply unequal because of the failure to permit a special postconflict development strategy, while the transition from one government to another has become locked in what is called "democratic minimalism." Narrow donor obsessions and short-term demands have played into the hands of an increasingly corrupt elite.

The third case study, in Chapter 16, examines the case of Cambodia. Cambodian postconflict development is no success story. Willemijn Verkoren identifies a number of cross-cutting issues that affect development strategies in the various sectors of society: the failure of demobilization and the reintegration of combatants, the troublesome depoliticization of structures and institutions, the lack of trust and reconciliation, and the fact that many of the causes of the conflict have yet to be addressed. The underlying causes of the Cambodian conflict were strengthened, not solved, by armed warfare, and are still present in Cambodian society today.

In Chapter 17, our concluding chapter, a number of central and returning themes are identified and a list of dilemmas, open questions, and topics for further research is provided.

Although this book does not give a complete and comprehensive account of postconflict development strategies in all sectors of society, nor prescribe detailed recipes for postconflict planning, it contributes to policy formulation by providing a broad and thorough overview of the main considerations that have to be taken into account when designing and applying development policies in countries recovering from violent conflict. It will serve to make the reader more conscious of the dangers and opportunities inherent in postconflict situations and the ways in which development can contribute to building peace.

Notes

1. See Collier et al. (2003, 6), regarding the World Bank policy research report *Breaking the Conflict Trap:*

Economic development is central to reducing the global incidence of conflict; however, this does not mean that the standard elements of development strategy—market access policy reform, and aid—are sufficient, or even appropriate, to address the problem. At the most basic level, development has to reach countries that it has so far missed. Beyond this, development strategies should look different in countries facing a high risk of conflict, where the problems and priorities are distinctive. In addition, some policies that are not normally part of development strategy affect the risk of conflict, such as the presence of external peacekeeping forces, the tendency toward domestic military expenditures, and the design of political institutions.

The World Bank's 2004 report *The Role of the World Bank in Conflict and Development* adds that "countries facing a high risk of conflict must also look at the development challenge through a different lens, paying particular attention to their vulnerability to conflict and the impact that strategies and policies may have in mitigating or aggravating the risk of conflict" (14).

2. Already in 1995, the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development established a task force to focus on the linkages between conflict, peace, and development cooperation. The U.S. Agency for International Development hosted an international conference on postconflict development in 1997. The UN Development Program started to address postconflict situations explicitly in the second half of the 1990s (UNDP 2002a).

3. Duffield adds that this new commitment to "the reconstruction of societies in such a way as to prevent war" represents a marked radicalization of the politics of development. "Societies must be changed so that past problems do not arise, as happened with development in the past; moreover, this process cannot be left to chance but requires direct and concerted action." See Duffield (2001, 15).

4. The World Bank's 2004 report *The Role of the World Bank in Conflict and Development*, for example, explicitly mentions the aid effectiveness debate and growing recognition of the special needs of conflict-ridden countries as reasons to reassess standard economic development policy, at least in postconflict countries.

5. See Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work (1993).

6. Michael Ignatieff (1998) found this aspect important enough to give his book on civil wars the title *The Warrior's Honour*.