


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# Why Enduring Rivalries Do—or Don't—End

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# 1

## Understanding Rivalry

Why do some enduring rivalries end while others continue? This book explains the termination of enduring rivalries—disputes between states that involve repeated military confrontation over a significant period of time—by examining clusters of rivalries that began at similar points in history, but had different termination points. Rivalries are marked by the failure of two states to find bargaining space for agreement on one or more issues. The contemporary Middle East is an excellent example of this phenomenon. The Israeli rivalries with Egypt and Syria began at the same time, but have had very different outcomes. One ended with a peace treaty; the other, though less intense than it once was, has yet to be officially terminated. Likewise, the early 20<sup>th</sup> century witnessed the end of a number of major Latin American rivalries while others, over similar issues, continued. The best example of this is Peruvian attempts to end rivalries with its neighbors in the 1920s and 1930s. It succeeded in resolving major issues with Chile and Columbia, but failed to settle its border dispute with Ecuador. Its dispute with Ecuador would persist into the 1990s.

I argue that the termination of rivalries can only occur when one or both states party to a rivalry experience a major failure in meeting foreign policy and domestic expectations that leads to a revised foreign policy outlook, creating bargaining space between the rivals.<sup>1</sup> This change is likely to happen after a repeated failure of a state to achieve its foreign and domestic policy goals and will be accompanied by dramatic changes in the political leadership of a state. The mechanism through which the combined failures operate is to strengthen the role of doves in the making of foreign policy decisions and the minimization of the ability of hawks to challenge more pacific rivalry policies.<sup>2</sup> I rely on an informal rational learning model to explain why both domestic and foreign policy failure are needed to drive change. Not every foreign or domestic failure will lead to a change in government that results in a new foreign policy that opens bargaining space; this book identifies the

conditions that make such a shift likely and the conditions in the receiving state that make it amenable to negotiation.

I evaluate this argument through an in-depth study of enduring rivalries in the Middle East from 1967 to 1980 and in Latin America from 1879 to 1932. Specifically, the book will compare Israeli relations with Syria and Egypt after the Six Day War in 1967 to Peruvian relations with Chile and Ecuador from 1879-1932 with emphasis on the years 1919-1930. As noted above, Israel was able to successfully sign a peace agreement with Egypt, while efforts to negotiate with Syria have not resulted in a peace treaty. Likewise, Peru was able to sign and enforce a peace agreement with Chile but not with Ecuador. The use of these studies provides a similar comparison in two different time periods in two different regions.

The question of why some rivalries end while others do not is important for both normative and theoretical reasons. First, some studies indicate that more than half of all military disputes take place in the context of a rivalry situation.<sup>3</sup> In order to better understand how to manage and end rivalries, scholars must better understand the processes that lead to rivalry termination. Second, traditional international relations literature has largely ignored the question of why enduring rivalries end in favor of studying why wars begin. The only literature that has systematically examined the question of rivalry termination is a body of quantitative work examining rivalry dynamics.<sup>4</sup> While this literature has provided valuable insights, it has often not done so in a rigorous theoretical framework.

Though some recent work in strategic interaction addresses the structure necessary for successful bargaining, the strategic interaction literature has, for the most part, ignored the questions of why a state's preferences change allowing for bargaining space where there may have been none before. This book, by drawing on the insights from strategic interaction and quantitative studies, makes a valuable contribution to the advancement of knowledge on enduring rivalries by developing and testing a theory of why states decide to terminate their rivalries.<sup>5</sup> Further, it contributes to a growing literature that ties foreign policy actions to the internal political dynamics of a state, particularly works that assume that the primary goal of any political leader is to remain in power.<sup>6</sup> This explanation will also explain why not all attempts to terminate a rivalry succeed.

The book also makes a methodological contribution to the study of conflict and conflict termination. When studying the origins of wars or their conclusions, most qualitative scholars fail to examine instances of

not war or not peace. Admittedly, discussing an instance when peace did not occur is far more difficult than when it did, but this approach provides variation on the dependent variable and a level of control not normally seen in qualitative research.

The remainder of this chapter lays out the definitions of enduring rivalry and rivalry termination and reviews the existing literature on rivalry termination.

## **Defining Rivalry**

The concept of enduring rivalry is a matter of some debate. Most scholars agree that enduring rivalries are marked by high levels of tension between two states for a long period of time; they disagree, however, on how to identify rivalries. Most rivalry definitions can be fit into one of three categories: 1) exclusive focus on number of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs);<sup>7</sup> 2) exclusive focus on actors' perceptions and issues of disagreement;<sup>8</sup> and 3) some combination of the two. Scholars associated with each of these definitions have developed unique sets of cases that match their definitions. Depending on the number of disputes required to be considered a rivalry, the time period under analysis, or the role of perceptions and issues, and what constitutes rivalry termination, the number of rivalries may vary from as few as 34 to as many as 290.

Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson delve deeply into the issue of rivalry definition, comparing six enduring rivalry databases (two developed by Bennett, one developed by Goertz and Diehl, one developed by Klein, Goertz, and Diehl, one developed by Maoz and Mor, and their own database), and find that the level of agreement between the databases is quite low. Though the largest dataset – that of Klein, et. al., contains 290 cases, only 23 cases appear in all of the datasets, though some of the cases not considered matching do have a degree of overlap.<sup>9</sup> The lack of agreement between datasets arises largely due to different manners of measuring the number of disputes between the parties, the number of disputes required, and the temporal connection of the disputes. The exception to this is the Colaresi, et. al., database which focuses primarily on state perceptions of one another. In their view, how states perceive other threats is more important than the number of disputes. For them, then, the United States' occupations of Haiti did not arise because the United States considered Haiti a threat, but due to other interests in Haitian politics.<sup>10</sup>

Rather than creating a new definition and a new universe of cases that would introduce further debate over an issue that has already clouded the study of enduring rivalries, this book's focus is on why certain rivalries defy settlement. It therefore draws on the existing definitions of rivalry, but seeks out cases that are, for the most part, widely agreed upon in the rivalry literature. I argue that an enduring rivalry must exist over a period of time and have the potential for military conflict, concepts with which all of the above definitions agree. Further, rivals should not just view each other as threats, but be actual threats to one another, suggesting that military competition should play a role. In this regard, I agree with Bennett's conception of a rivalry as:

... a dyad in which two states disagree over the resolution of some issue(s) between them for an extended period of time, leading them to commit substantial resources... toward opposing each other, and in which relatively frequent diplomatic or military challenges to the disputed status quo are made by one or both of the states.<sup>11</sup>

Each of the rivalries examined in this book appear in the dataset drawn from Bennett's 1996 work, which requires states to have engaged in five militarized disputes over a period of 25 years with a clear issue connecting the conflicts.<sup>12</sup> Three of the rivalries, Israel-Egypt, Israel-Syria, and Peru-Ecuador, appear in every dataset Colaresi, et. al., examine. The fourth, Peru-Chile, appears in four datasets.<sup>13</sup> Based on the widespread view of these disputes as rivalries, this book fits well in the enduring rivalries literature.

## **Literature Review**

Though the literature that may relate to rivalry termination generally is quite expansive, very few scholars have specifically addressed the question of rivalry termination. The majority of work on enduring rivalries to this point has been quantitative in nature, though an increasing number of works are using formal models to address questions of trust and the stability of agreements between rivals. Among the variables scholars have found to have significance on the end of rivalry are polity change, major wars, revolutions, democracy, domestic political factors and issue salience (the importance of the issues at stake), and the emergence of new and/or mutual threats.<sup>14</sup> In his work integrating the various statistical models of rivalry termination, Bennett finds polity change to be one of the most significant variables affecting

termination.<sup>15</sup> Diehl and Grieg also find that the presence of at least one democratizing state in a dyad is related to a de-escalation of a rivalry relationship.<sup>16</sup> The primary drawbacks of the existing statistical literature are two-fold. Many of the variables identified in the rivalry literature are extremely sensitive to coding issues. For example, manipulating the time frame under analysis can lead to contradictory conclusions.<sup>17</sup> This problem leads into the second drawback of existing literature: it often lacks a cohesive explanatory framework.<sup>18</sup>

Works by Maoz and Mor, Kydd, and Schultz have specifically addressed rivalry termination by using game theoretic approaches.<sup>19</sup> Maoz and Mor's work is the most comprehensive in that it examines the overall dynamics of enduring rivalries, of which rivalry termination is only a part. Their model relies on learning to explain preference change. They find that learning often does not occur in the expected direction; states often "learn" the wrong lessons.<sup>20</sup>

In contrast to Maoz and Mor's more comprehensive approach, Kydd and Schultz both focus on the last phases of rivalry termination. Kydd develops a model to explain how costly signaling can improve trust, while Schultz models domestic politics to explain why, based on political calculations, a "moderate hawk" is the most likely leader to initiate and make a lasting peace with a rival. Both of these models suffer from a common problem: neither sufficiently explains the decision by either party in a rivalry either to send costly signals or enter into negotiation.<sup>21</sup>

Though Kydd and Schultz are not fully adequate explanations for rivalry termination, both do rely, in part, on domestic politics to explain the termination process, Schultz by giving a significant role in the electorate to shape foreign policy and Kydd by drawing on other literatures to explain signaling. One key element for Schultz at least is that before any decision to negotiate can occur, there must be an increase in costs such that the costs of continued conflict exceed the costs of negotiation.<sup>22</sup> Why might this occur? One possibility from the literature is the concept of ripeness or a hurting stalemate. If a rivalry is, for the most part, low-cost for the participants, the chances that one side will negotiate are small. If, however, the conflict "hurts" either or both parties, they are more likely to try to extricate themselves from the conflict.<sup>23</sup>

Making the connection to domestic politics complete, Chiozza and Goemans offer some support for the idea that leaders make foreign policy decisions based at least in part on their stability in office.

Contrary to the insights of the diversionary war literature, however, Chiozza and Goemans find that leaders that face a high risk of losing office are less likely to initiate war than leaders who are secure in office, regardless of regime type.<sup>24</sup> This finding does not mean that a leader at risk of losing office will initiate peace talks, but it does suggest that violence between rivals becomes less likely as one side experiences a greater risk of losing office.<sup>25</sup>

To summarize, the existing statistical literature has shown a strong connection between domestic politics and decisions not to fight (as well as decisions to fight). Drawing on these findings, existing models of the interplay of a domestic audience and the decision to negotiate, I argue that leaders facing domestic turmoil are more likely to alter foreign policy, particularly rivalry policies, to free up internal resources to solidify their ruling coalition or to repress opposition. This argument is not deterministic; leaders facing internal strife are more likely to negotiate than those who are not, but may not do so if they can hold on to power by other means.

### **The Plan for the Book**

In order to explain rivalry termination, Chapter Two turns to a theoretical treatment of the end of enduring rivalries consistent with the criteria set out above based on the importance of developing strong domestic coalitions in the wake of both domestic and foreign policy failures. The chapter also includes an alternative explanation based on the insights of neorealism and concludes with a discussion of the methodology to be used in the case studies. The case studies were chosen to identify four rivalries, two that were successfully terminated and two that were not. To add more control to the study, I examine pairs of rivalries in which one state successfully ends one of its rivalries while failing to terminate another. To meet this design, Israeli relations with Egypt and Syria in the later 1960s and 1970s are compared to Peruvian relations with Chile and Ecuador during the 1920s.

Chapter Three applies the model developed in Chapter Two to relations between Israel and Egypt from the time of the 1967 Six Day War until their peace agreement in 1979. I find that Egypt underwent a fundamental shift in its foreign policy after 1967 after the combination of domestic problems and failure in war allowed Egyptian president Nasser to eliminate his more hard-line opponents within government. His new policies eliminated many of those within his government who supported a more centralized economy and a policy of rejecting any



negotiations with Israel. Israel, on the other hand, did not reciprocate Egypt's overtures until after the October War in 1973. Though Israel won the war, the strong showing of the Arab armies surprised Israeli officials. At the same time, 1973 marked the beginning of several years of economic problems. Israel went on to sign two disengagement agreements with Egypt before signing the Camp David Accords and a final peace treaty.

Chapter Four discusses Israel and Syrian relations from the Six Day War until 1980. In this case, Syria made changes in its foreign and domestic policies after its loss in the 1967 war. The battle between Salah Jadid and Hafiz al-Asad was over both foreign and domestic policy; Jadid represented a more radical view on both fronts whereas Asad was more moderate. Interestingly, despite the eventual victory of Asad over Jadid and the subsequent moderation of Syrian policy, Israel and Syria did not find sufficient bargaining space to reach a formal peace agreement, though they did sign a disengagement agreement that continues to be in force as of 2005.

Relations between Peru and Chile from 1919 until 1930 are the focus of Chapter Five. In Peru, a challenging domestic situation led to the election of Augusto B. Leguía who seized power in a coup before he was inaugurated as president. His initial foreign policy continued a Peruvian tradition of attempting to bring Peru's dispute with Chile before an external arbiter, preferably the United States. When Peru lost in arbitration, Leguía had the freedom to change course and reach a negotiated settlement with Chile as he had successfully eliminated those opposed to peace from his government while in power. For its part, Chile suffered from both economic and foreign policy difficulties in the 1920s. Chile's failure to join the allied forces in World War I left it diplomatically isolated, while domestically lower economic classes were pressing for inclusion in the government. Early reform efforts were defeated by the old oligarchy, and the government squandered its victory in arbitration with Peru by throwing up obstacles to a plebiscite that Chile had supported. Its subsequent embarrassment and continued domestic turmoil led to the rise of General Carlos Ibáñez who dramatically reformed Chile's domestic political structure and signed a peace agreement with Peru.

Chapter Six turns to relations between Peru and Ecuador from 1919-1930. In addition to Peru's difficulties with Chile in the 1920s, it had suffered a territorial setback in its dispute with Ecuador due to a peace agreement between Ecuador and Colombia in which Ecuador ceded lands claimed by Peru to Colombia. The combined failure in foreign and

domestic policy did lead to a change in Peruvian foreign policy; in this case it changed its policy toward Colombia, signing an agreement in which it received many of the lands it had previously claimed from Ecuador. In response to this setback and a major revolution in 1925, Ecuador did begin to reform its negotiating position with Peru. However, Peru had little interest in negotiating with Ecuador as it had already satisfied many of its demands. In addition, Ecuador suffered from an extremely unstable domestic environment that made any long-term diplomatic initiative difficult to sustain.

Chapter Seven is the conclusion of the book and includes an examination of Israeli-Syrian relations and Peruvian-Ecuadorian relations in the 1990s. The cases examined in the book provide strong evidence that it is a combination of domestic and foreign policy difficulties that leads to changes in foreign policy. These changes in foreign policy *can* lead to rivalry termination if sufficient bargaining space is opened. At times, however, even if both parties to a rivalry make significant changes to their preferences, bargaining space may not be opened. In that regard, the book makes headway to establishing necessary, but not sufficient conditions for the termination of enduring rivalries.

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<sup>1</sup> See Legro, "The Transformation of Policy Ideas;" and "Whence American Internationalism," for a discussion of epistemic shifts.

<sup>2</sup> Doves may be a relative term. For example, in examining Egyptian/Israeli relations in the 1970s, Dayan is identified with "dovish" policies in that he was one of the first in the Israeli government to favor an interim agreement with Egypt. At the same time, he was a decorated war hero that clearly believed in maintaining a strong military position vis-à-vis Israel's rivals.

<sup>3</sup> Diehl "Introduction: An Overview and Some Theoretical Guidelines," p. 7; Maoz and Mor *Bound by Struggle*, p. 4, and Colaresi, et. al., *Strategic Rivalries*, pp. 13-16.

<sup>4</sup> The term enduring rivalry was coined by this statistical literature.

<sup>5</sup> See Bueno de Mesquita, "Domestic Politics and International Relations" on the importance of methodological diversity within a research program. To date, little rigorous theoretical and case study research has been done on enduring rivalries. This book fills that hole.

<sup>6</sup> David, "Explaining Third World Alignment;" Schultz, *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy*, (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Schultz, "The Politics of Risking Peace;" Goemans, *War and Punishment*; Chiozza and Goemans, "Peace Through Insecurity;" Chiozza and Goemans, "International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders;" Chiozza and Goemans, "Avoiding Diversionary Targets;" Bueno de Mesquita, et. al., *The Logic of Political Survival*; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, "War and the

Survival of Political Leaders;" Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, *War and Reason*.

<sup>7</sup> See Klein, et. al., "The New Rivalry Dataset;" Goertz and Diehl, "The Empirical Importance of Enduring Rivalries," pp. 151-63; Goertz and Diehl, "The Initiation and Termination of Enduring Rivalries," pp. 31-2 for an example of this approach.

<sup>8</sup> See Thompson, "Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics;" Thompson, "Why Rivalries Matter;" Thompson, "Principle Rivalries;" and Colaresi, et. al., *Strategic Rivalries* for an example of this approach. Thompson has developed a quite sophisticated way of categorizing rivalries based on state perceptions. For Thompson, two states need never engage in conflict to be considered rivals.

<sup>9</sup> Colaresi, et. al., *Strategic Rivalries*, pp. 56-57.

<sup>10</sup> The Haiti / United States rivalry does not appear in their dataset, but does appear in others. It appears, for example, in Klein, et. al., "The New Rivalry Dataset."

<sup>11</sup> Bennett "Security, Bargaining and the End of Interstate Rivalry," p. 160.

<sup>12</sup> Bennett "Security, Bargaining and the End of Interstate Rivalry," and Bennett, "Democracy, Regime Change, and Rivalry Termination" share this operationalization of rivalry. Bennett, "Measuring Rivalry Termination," and Bennett, "Integrating and Testing," modify this operationalization slightly by not considering two states to be in a rivalry until they have had the requisite number of disputes.

<sup>13</sup> It appears in Bennett "Security, Bargaining and the End of Interstate Rivalry;" Colaresi, et. al., *Strategic Rivalries*; Klein, Et. al., "The New Rivalry Dataset;" and Maoz and Mor, *Bound by Struggle*. For more on the debate regarding the operationalization of rivalry, see Colaresi, et. al., *Strategic Rivalries*, Chapter Two.

<sup>14</sup> Bennett, "Measuring Rivalry Termination;" Bennett, "Security, Bargaining and the End of Interstate Rivalry;" Bennett, "Democracy, Regime Change, and Rivalry Termination;" Bennett, "Integrating and Testing Models of Rivalry Duration;" Goertz and Diehl, "The Initiation and Termination of Enduring Rivalries;" Diehl and Goertz, "War and Peace in International Rivalry;" Greig and Diehl, "Softening Up: Making Conflicts More Amenable to Diplomacy;" Greig, "Moments of Opportunity."

<sup>15</sup> Bennett, "Integrating and Testing Models of Rivalry Duration," pp. 1223-4.

<sup>16</sup> Greig and Diehl, "Softening Up," pp. 376-7.

<sup>17</sup> Bennett, "Integrating and Testing Models of Rivalry Duration," pp. 1224-7.

<sup>18</sup> See *ibid.* for discussion of this problem in other studies of rivalry termination. He resolves this to an extent by arguing for a rational actor framework in examining rivalry termination, but the actual construction of his model does not clearly necessitate his theoretical framework.

<sup>19</sup> Maoz and Mor, *Bound by Struggle*; Kydd, "Trust, Reassurance and Cooperation;" Kydd, *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations*; Schultz, "The Politics of Risking Peace."

<sup>20</sup> Maoz and Mor, "Learning, Preference Change, and the Evolution of Enduring Rivalries," p. 151; and Leng, *Bargaining and Learning in Recurring Crises*, p. 185, echo this concern.

<sup>21</sup> Kydd, for example, draws on constructivist explanations for policy change in the Soviet Union. Kydd, "Trust, Reassurance and Cooperation, pp. 342, 350-1.

<sup>22</sup> Schultz, "The Politics of Risking Peace," p. 25.

<sup>23</sup> The concept of a "hurting stalemate" is also related to the concept of conflict ripeness which is frequently cited as a necessary condition for negotiations to proceed. See: Hancock, "To Act or Wait;" Zartman and Berman, *The Practical Negotiator*; Greig and Diehl, "Softening Up;" Greig, "Moments of Opportunity;" Haass, *Conflicts Unending*.

<sup>24</sup> Chiozza and Goemans, "Peace Through Insecurity," p. 453, 456. See also Chiozza and Goemans, "Avoiding Diversionary Targets;" and Chiozza and Goemans, "International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders." On diversionary war, see Mansfield and Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War;" Mercer, "Anarchy and Identity;" and Miller, "Regime Type, Strategic Interaction, and the Diversionary Use of Force."

<sup>25</sup> These results are similar to findings by Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, "War and the Survival of Political Leaders," pp. 841-855.